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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to sections 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the 
Utah Code. This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Utah Supreme Court on December 22, 1988. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The plaintiffs, J. Marius Nielson and Faye K. Nielson, 
brought this action against defendants Prowswood, Ltd., dba Prows-
wood Realtor ("Prowswood"), and Rita Luke, a Prowswood real estate 
agent, seeking specific performance of an agreement to purchase a 
condominium, which they claimed Ms. Luke entered into on behalf 
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of Prowswood. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the 
Nielsons and against the defendants jointly and severally entered 
after a bench trial before the Honorable David S. Young. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did Prowswood waive any defense based on Utah Code 
Ann. S 25-5-1 that it may have had? 
2. Does section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code apply to the 
facts of this case? 
3. Was the trial court's finding that Ms. Luke had 
authority to bind Prowswood to an agreement to purchase the Niel-
sons' condominium clearly erroneous? 
4. Was the trial court's finding that Prowswood ratified 
the agreement clearly erroneous? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
limiting evidence of Mr. Nielson's experience as a real estate 
broker? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Interpretation of rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is determinative of the first issue stated above. 
Rules 8 and 12 are set out verbatim in the Addendum. 
Interpretation of section 61-2-2(7) and (9) of the Utah 
Code is determinative of the third issue stated above. Section 61-
2-2 is set out verbatim in the Addendum. 
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Interpretation of rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, which are set out verbatim in the Addendum, is 
determinative of the fifth issue stated above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nielsons brought this action seeking specific per-
formance of an agreement requiring Prowswood to purchase a con-
dominium unit that the Nielsons bought through Prowswood and its 
agent, Rita Luke, The matter was tried before the Honorable David 
S. Young, who granted judgment in favor of the Nielsons against 
Prowswood and Luke jointly and severally. 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
1. Defendant Luke has been a licensed real estate sales 
agent for defendant Prowswood for ten years. 1 Trial Transcript 
(hereinafter HTr.M) at 156. Ms. Luke was initially an employee 
of Prowswood. Jd. at 159. In 1984 she entered into a written 
agreement with Prowswood entitled Agreement—Independent Contrac-
tor. Ld. at 202; Exhibit 15-D(a). The written agreement did not 
change how Ms. Luke acted vis-a-vis Prowswood. 1 Tr. at 160. 
2. Ms. Luke has worked exclusively for Prowswood ever 
since she obtained her real estate license. JId. at 166. 
3. At all relevant times, Prowswood provided Ms. Luke 
with an office, secretary, telephone, business cards and Prowswood 
letterhead for stationery. Id. at 161-65. See also Exhibit 7-P. 
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4. Ms. Luke was Prowswood's leading sales producer 
for the last ten years and is a lifetime member of the Million 
Dollar Club of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS. 1 Tr. at 168. 
5. Prowswood has accordingly granted Ms. Luke a great 
deal of authority. Ms. Luke has authority to sign listing agree-
ments, to sell and lease property on behalf of Prowswood. Id. at 
171-74. Moreover, Prowswood has given her Mthe latitude to waive 
receipt of commissions both for herself and for [Prowswood] as a 
brokerage when she feels that circumstances justify such an action." 
Exhibit 4-P. 
6. The authority that Prowswood gave Ms. Luke to act 
on its behalf in waiving its commissions was generally given orally 
and not in writing. Iji. at 171. 
7. In the fall of 1985, the Nielsons were residents 
of California, where Mr. Nielson was involved in the mortgage 
banking business. 1 Tr. at 12 & 58. 
8. At that time, the business that Mr. Nielson worked 
for was sold, and the Nielsons decided to move back to Utah. Id. 
at 12 & 59. 
9. In November 1985, the Nielsons came to Salt Lake 
City to look for a home. Id. at 12-15 & 61. The Nielsons decided 
to lease a home because Mr. Nielson had not yet found a job in Salt 
Lake City and they did not know whether they would stay there 
permanently. Id. at 14 & 62-63. 
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10. The Nielsons contacted Ms. Luke and clearly told 
her that they wanted to lease property for at least one year and 
did not wish to buy. Id. at 30, 33, 63 & 102. 
11. Ms. Luke showed the Nielsons unit 25 of the Brook-
stone Condominiums, which was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Koch and listed 
with Prowswood. Id. at 15-16. 
12. Within two days of their first visit to the Koch 
unit, the Nielsons told Ms. Luke that they were interested in 
leasing the unit, and arrangements were made for a second visit. 
Id. at 16. 
13. Before showing the Nielsons the Koch unit a second 
time, Ms. Luke obtained verbal authority from her broker at Prows-
wood, John Langley, to waive Prowswood's commission if the unit 
were to be resold. Id. at 125. 
14. At the time she made arrangements for the second 
visit, Ms. Luke knew that the Koches had to sell the unit by April 
1986 and thus could not take a lease for more than four months, 
which was unacceptable to the Nielsons. IcL at 177-79 & 183-84. 
15. After the second visit, Mr. Nielson asked Ms. Luke 
the terms of the lease, and Ms. Luke informed him that there was 
a problem. Id. at 65, 103-05. Ms. Luke told the Nielsons that 
the Koches could not lease the unit for more than four months, 
and the Nielsons told her that such terms were unacceptable. Id. 
at 17 & 65-66. 
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16. Ms. Luke proposed the following solution: If the 
Nielsons would buy the unit and later decided that they did not 
want it, Prowswood would sell the unit and waive its commission 
if necessary so that the Nielsons would get back their net price 
of $160,000; if Prowswood could not sell the unit within 120 days, 
it would take the property back, provided that the Nielsons would 
let Prowswood try to sell the property during the summer, the prime 
selling months, id. at 18-19, 37-38, 65-66 & 105. 
17. Ms. Luke told the Nielsons that Robert Wood, execu-
tive vice-president of Prowswood Corporation, had authorized the 
same offer to another prospective buyer of unit 25 and that she 
had talked to Mr. Wood, who had agreed to let her make the offer 
to the Nielsons. Id. at 18-19, 66; see also 2 Tr. at 7-8. 
18. Mr. Nielson asked Ms. Luke if she had authority to 
enter into the proposed agreement, and Ms. Luke told him that she 
did, that Mr. Wood had given her the authority. 1 Tr. at 18-19, 
41, 67 & 105-06. 
19. On November 29, 1985, while Ms. Luke wrote up the 
earnest money agreement on unit 25, Mr. Nielson reduced the pur-
chase agreement to writing. Id. at 19-20, 39-40, 67-68 & 108. The 
agreement (hereinafter "AgreementH) stated that, as a condition 
of the Nielsons' buying the condominium, 
Prowswood Realtor agrees to guarantee resale 
or repurchase of property at a price that will 
generate net funds to Nielsons at least equal 
to their purchase price of $160,000, provided 
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they elect to not retain possession of property 
prior to June 1, 1986, If this election is 
made, Prowswood Realtor shall have 120 days 
to effect sale or purchase property as afore-
mentioned. 
Exhibit 1-P. 
20. Ms. Luke read the Agreement, said that it was fine 
and signed it. 1 Tr. at 111. 
21. Upon returning to California in November 1985, Mr. 
Nielson sent a copy of the Agreement to Ms. Luke. Ms. Luke tes-
tified that she did not receive a copy, nor did she ask for one. 
Id. at 81, 113 & 190. 
22. After the Agreement was signed, John Langley did 
not ask to see a copy of the Agreement and had no further discus-
sions with Ms. Luke regarding it. 1 Tr. at 189-90. 
23. The Nielsons relied upon the Agreement and purchased 
unit 25 from the Koches for the sum of $160,000. Id. at 22, 44 & 
69; Exhibit 2-P. The Nielsons would not have bought the property 
were it not for the Agreement. Ld. at 22 & 69. 
24. By a letter dated May 10, 1986, which the parties 
stipulated Prowswood received before June 1, 1986, the Nielsons 
informed Prowswood that they were electing to exercise their rights 
under the Agreement. 1 Tr. at 55, 74; Exhibit 3-P. 
25. Richard S. Prows, President of the Prowswood Cor-
poration and Chairman of the Board of Prowswood, Ltd., wrote the 
Nielsons on June 10, 1986, and stated, in part: 
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Rita [Luke] has been a successful real 
estate agent for our firm for over 11 years. 
We have never had a moment's hesitation about 
her representations nor the contract negotia-
tions in which she has been involved. Addi-
tionally, because of her reputation and the 
confidence we have in her, we have given her 
the latitude to waive receipt of commissions 
both for herself and for us as a brokerage 
when she feels that circumstances justify such 
an action. This current "agreement" is reflec-
tive of that type of commitment• 
Our current reputation for honesty and 
clarity is being tested by this situation. 
Because you are valuable friends we have a 
special interest in seeing that your feelings 
and expectations are delicately dealt withe 
In light of this, we feel that it is a reason-
able compromise that Rita, as the sub-agent 
for me, be permitted to immediately begin a 
marketing program of your property to affect 
[sic] a desired sale. In keeping with our 
original understanding of the "agreement", we 
will bear expenses relative to marketing your 
home and, of course, endeavor to net you the 
$160,000.00 mentioned in the November 29th 
"agreement" . . . even if it is necessary for 
us to forgo all commissions to accomplish that 
end. 
My involvement is to reaffirm our united 
stand and our deepest commitment to do all in 
our power to fulfill what we feel is our obli-
gation under this "agreement". 
Exhibit 4-P. 
26. Prowswood did not purchase the property on or before 
September 10, 1986. 
27. The Nielsons filed their complaint in this action 
on May 5, 1987, Record at 2, and Prowswood filed its answer on 
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June 2, 1987, id. at 34. Nowhere in that answer did Prowswood 
plead the statute of frauds as a defense. Id. at 34-38. 
28. On May 23, 1988, a pretrial conference was held in 
this case, at which time trial of this matter was set for June 7, 
1988. id. at 98. The statute of frauds was not raised in any 
pretrial order. 
29. On June 3, 1988, Prowswood moved for leave to amend 
its answer to assert as an affirmative defense the statute of 
frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Id. at 107-08. A hearing on the 
motion was scheduled for June 7, 1988, the day of trial. Id. at 
105. 
30. On June 7, 1988, the court continued the trial to 
July 19, 1988, because another case was being tried on June 7. 
Id. at 174. 
31. At Prowswood's request, the hearing on its motion 
for leave to file an amended answer was continued four times, the 
last time to July 18, 1988, the day before trial. See id. at 181-
87. 
32. On July 18, 1988, the court denied Prowswood's motion 
for leave to file an amended answer, id. at 261, and the case went 
to trial as scheduled, id. at 262. 
33. At trial, Wilbern McDougal, a realtor with over 
twenty-five years of experience and past President of the Utah 
Association of REALTORS and the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS, 
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testified that, in his opinion, "most companies have had some type 
of a guaranteed sales program" by which a brokerage agrees to buy 
a seller's property if it cannot sell the property. 1 Tr. at 130, 
129. 
34. Mr. McDougal further testified that his experienced 
real estate agents were authorized to sign guaranteed sales program 
agreements. Jd. at 132, 135-36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prowswood raises several issues on appeal. The first 
issue—whether Ms. Luke could bind Prowswood to purchase the Niel-
sons' property without written authority—was not raised by the 
pleadings or addressed by the trial court and therefore is not 
properly before this court. Prowswood waived the issue by failing 
to timely raise it in the trial court. (Point II.) 
Even if the issue of written authority were properly 
raised, it does not constitute grounds for reversal because the 
statute of frauds is inapplicable on the facts of this case. (Point 
III.) 
The second and third issues Prowswood raises—Ms. Luke's 
power to bind Prowswood to the Agreement and Prowswood's ratifica-
tion of the Agreement—are factual issues. The trial court's 
findings of fact cannot be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous. (Point I.) 
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The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Ms. 
Luke had power to bind Prowswood to the Agreement, under a theory 
of either apparent authority (Point IV) or inherent agency power 
(Point V). Ms. Luke was Prowswood's general agent, and, in entering 
into the Agreement, she was only doing what was incidental to a 
transaction she was authorized to perform, namely, agreeing to 
list and sell real estate. 
Neither did the trial court clearly err in finding that 
Prowswood ratified the Agreement after it learned all the material 
facts. Mr. Prows wrote the Nielsons in June 1986, evidencing his 
intent to stand by Prowswood's agent whatever the parties' agreement 
was. (Point VI.) 
As for the fourth issue, the trial court did not commit 
reversible error in excluding evidence as to Mr. Nielson's experi-
ence as a real estate broker because such evidence was cumulative 
at best. (Point VII.) 
Finally, the Nielsons take no position with respect to 
the last issue Prowswood raises, namely, whether it is entitled 
to a judgment over against Ms. Luke. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CANNOT BE SET 
ASIDE UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a trial 
to the court. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states that 
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findings of fact entered after a bench trial, "whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The clearly 
erroneous standard applies whether the case is one in equity or 
at law. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The appellate court presumes the findings of fact of 
the trial court to be correct. Gillmore v. Gillmore, 745 P.2d 
461, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). On review, the appellate court 
"views the evidence and all the inferences that can reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in the light most supportive of the trial court's 
findings." Id. tquoting Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 
1984)). To challenge a finding of fact, the appellant must marshall 
all the evidence that supports the trial court's finding and show 
why, even viewing it in the light most favorable to the trial court, 
it is insufficient to support the finding made. General Glass 
Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.. 766 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
As long as the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court should sustain 
the judgment even if it might have come to a different decision 
had it been trying the matter. Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. RUPP, 532 
P.2d 682, 683 (Utah 1975). 
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II. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY DEFENSE BASED ON 
UTAH CODE ANN, S 25-5-1. 
It is axiomatic that issues not raised by the pleadings 
and not addressed by the trial court cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. See, e.g., Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 
1986); Bundv v. Century Equip. Co,, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). 
This is especially true of affirmative defenses based on the statute 
of frauds. See, e.g., L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 449-
50 (Utah 1984); City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 
P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983); Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 
884 (Utah 1983). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (statute of frauds 
is an affirmative defense that must be pled). 
Prowswood did not plead the statute of frauds, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and -3, as an affirmative defense in its Answer to 
the plaintiff's Complaint. On May 23, 1988, a pretrial conference 
was held in this case, and the issue of the statute of frauds was 
not brought up at that time, nor was it raised in any pretrial 
order pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). On June 3, 
1988—four days before the scheduled trial date—Prowswood moved 
for leave to amend its Answer to assert an affirmative defense 
based on section 25-5-1. A hearing on the motion was scheduled 
for June 7, 1988, the day of trial. On June 7, 1988, the court 
continued the trial date to July 19, 1988, because another case 
was being tried on June 7. 
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At Prowswood's request, the hearing on its motions for 
leave to file an amended answer was continued four times, the last 
time to July 18, 1988, the day before trial. The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, like their federal counterparts, prohibit the 
introduction of new theories on the eve of trial. See, e.g.. 
Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1300 n.42 (5th 
Cir. 1988) petition for cert, filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. Apr. 
7, 1989J.1 On July 18, 1988, the court denied Prowswood's motion 
for leave to amend, and the case went to trial the next day. 
Prowswood has not appealed from the trial court's denial 
of its motions, nor has it raised any issue as to the propriety 
of the trial court's action in either the docketing statement or 
its brief on appeal. Rather, Prowswood is attempting to raise on 
appeal issues that the trial court has previously ruled were not 
timely raised. The consequence of Prowswood's failure to timely 
assert the statute of frauds defense is that the defense is waived. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h); Phillips, 666 P.2d at 884. 
Because the statute of frauds issue was never considered 
by the trial court and is not properly before this court, the court 
should not consider the issue. 
1
 To the extent that the Utah Rules are substantially 
similar to federal rules, this court can look to federal courts' 
interpretation of the federal rules in construing the applicable 
Utah Rules. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah 1984). 
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III. SECTION 25-5-1 IS INAPPLICABLE ON THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
Section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code states: 
No estate or interest in real property 
. . . nor any trust or power over or concerning 
real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, 
or bv his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
bv writing. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Courts have adopted an exception to the rule that an 
agent's authority to contract for the sale of real property be in 
writing when the person who acts under an oral authorization is a 
general agent of the principal. See, e.g., Mathis v. Madsen, 1 
Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 956 (1953). The trial court's decision 
and findings make it clear that Ms. Luke was a general agent of 
Prowswood. 
"A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a 
series of transactions involving a continuity of service." 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 3(1) (1957). The distinction 
between a general agent and a special agent, that is, an agent 
authorized to conduct only a single transaction or series of trans-
actions, is one of degree. Id. comment a. "Continuity of service 
rather than the extent of discretion or responsibility is the hall-
mark of the general agent." Id. 
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Ms. Luke had worked exclusively for Prowswood for over 
ten years. She was Prowswood's leading sales agent throughout 
this time. Prowswood provided her with an office, a secretary, 
business cards and Prowswood letterhead. It placed a great deal 
of confidence in her and gave her the latitude to act on its behalf 
in listing, selling and leasing real property. It allowed her to 
enter into negotiations on its behalf and to waive its commissions 
when she felt the circumstances justified such action. From this 
evidence, the trial court would certainly be justified in concluding 
that Ms. Luke was a general agent of Prowswood. Moreover, the 
trial court found that Ms. Luke had apparent authority from Prows-
wood to enter into the Agreement. Because Ms. Luke was Prowswoodfs 
general agent, that authority did not have to be in writing. 
In any event, any error that the trial court may have 
made in failing to consider the statute of frauds was harmless 
error under the circumstances. The trial court not only found 
that Ms. Luke had apparent authority to bind Prowswood, but it 
also found that Prowswood subsequently ratified the Agreement. 
Because that ratification was in writing, see infra, part VI, the 
absence of a writing authorizing Ms. Luke to enter into the Agree-
ment in the first place is simply irrelevant. See Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); Zeese v. Estate of Siecrel, 
534 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah 1975). 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT MS. LUKE 
HAD AUTHORITY TO BIND PROWSWOOD. 
The trial court found, as a matter of fact and of law, 
that Ms. Luke had apparent authority to bind Prowswood to the 
Agreement. Record at 305 11 55 & 1. The trial court's finding 
of fact was not clearly erroneous. 
It is well settled that apparent authority can be inferred 
only from the acts and conduct of the principal. Citv Elec. v. 
Dean Evans Chrvsler-Plvmouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983). There 
is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's con-
clusion that, by its acts, Prowswood clothed Ms. Luke with apparent 
authority to act in its behalf. Prowswood had employed Ms. Luke 
as an exclusive sales agent for ten years. During that time, while 
she obtained lifetime membership in the Million Dollar club, it 
received and retained the benefits of her services. It provided 
her with an office, secretary, telephone, business cards, and 
Prowswood stationery. Neither the business cards nor the stationery 
indicated any limitations on Ms. Luke's authority nor on her rela-
tionship with Prowswood. Prowswood gave her broad latitude to 
waive receipt of commissions both for herself and for Prowswood 
and "never had a moment's hesitation about her representations 
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nor the contract negotiations in which she has been involved." 
Exhibit 4-P.2 
From this evidence, the trial court properly concluded 
that Prowswood had given Ms. Luke apparent authority—if not actual 
authority—to do those acts that a real estate agent is authorized 
to do. 
Under Utah law, "real estate agents are vested with very 
broad powers." White v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1983). 
Subject to certain limitations, "real estate agents are empowered 
to perform all acts or transactions that their real estate broker 
may perform." Id.3 
2
 All of these facts distinguish this case from State By 
and Through Division of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corporation, 
760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). In that case, the state alleged that 
GAF had committed deceptive acts or practices in violation of the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act based on, among other things, 
certain warranties its alleged agent gave a consumer. The state 
admitted that GAF did not even know its alleged agent existed until 
seven years after the fact. The court held that, on those facts, 
merely providing promotional materials that happened to fall into 
a third party's hands was insufficient to pin liability on GAF on 
a theory of apparent authority. 760 P.2d at 314. 
3
 White was decided under former section 61-2-3, which 
defined "real estate salesman" to include "any person employed or 
engaged by or on behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or 
to deal in any act or transaction set out or comprehended by the 
definition of a real estate broker in section 61-2-2 . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3 (1953). Section 61-2-3 was repealed in 
1983. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 257 § 3. However, the substance of 
section 61-2-3 was carried over into new section 61-2-2, which 
defines a "real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" as "any person 
employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf 
of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set 
out in Subsection (7) for valuable consideration." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-2(9) (Supp. 1988). For the text of subsection (7), see 
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Under Utah law, real estate brokers are authorized to 
perform a wide range of activities. Utah law defines a "principal 
real estate broker" as 
any person who for another and for valuable 
consideration, or who with the intention or 
in the expectation or upon the promise of 
receiving or collecting valuable consideration, 
sells, exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases 
or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, 
rental or leasing of or offers or attempts or 
agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, pur-
chase, rental or leasing of, or lists or offers 
or attempts or agrees to list, or auctions, 
or offers or attempts or agrees to collect 
rental for the use of real estate or who adver-
tises, who buys or offers to buy, sells or 
offers to sell, or otherwise deals in options 
on real estate or the improvements thereon 
. . . or who advertises or holds himself, 
itself, or themselves as engaged in the business 
of selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting, 
or leasing real estate, or assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects or the negotiation 
or closing of any transaction which does or 
is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, 
leasing, or renting of any real estate . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)(a) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). 
It is a common marketing technique for a broker to agree 
to purchase property in order to obtain a listing or a sale, with 
its attendant commission. For example, in order to complete a 
sale, a broker may agree to purchase the buyer's home after a 
specified time. The benefits to the broker are that the buyer 
can qualify to purchase one home, on which the broker receives a 
infra. See also Addendum. 
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commission, and the broker obtains a future listing, with an oppor-
tunity to obtain a second commission. Or, in order to obtain a 
listing, a broker may agree to buy a prospective seller's home if 
it does not sell within a certain time. In either case there are 
obvious risks if the home does not sell. The broker may lose money. 
However, this is an accepted marketing technique based on business 
judgments as to its profitability. Prowswood itself has used the 
technique at times. See 2 Tr. at 8-9. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a real estate agent 
has authority to waive her broker's commission since the broker 
itself may waive its own commission. White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 
1302 (Utah 1983). Under the same reasoning, if a real estate broker 
may enter into a guaranteed purchase agreement, which it may under 
section 61-2-2(7)(a), the broker's real estate agent may also enter 
into such an agreement. 
In short, the trial court correctly concluded that Ms. 
Luke had apparent authority to bind Prowswood. 
This conclusion is supported by sound policy, as the 
Utah Supreme Court explained long ago: When Mone of two innocent 
parties must suffer from the wrongful act of a third person, . . . 
the loss should fall upon the one who by his conduct created the 
circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the wrong 
and cause the loss . . . ." Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 70 
Utah 11, 18, 257 P. 677 (1927). The brokerage firm, as the party 
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who placed its agent in a position to enter into the Agreement, 
should bear the responsibility for the Agreement. 
V. MS. LUKE HAD INHERENT AGENCY POWER TO BIND PROWSWOOD 
TO THE AGREEMENT. 
Although the trial court framed its conclusion in terms 
of "apparent authority," see Record at 275 and 305 II 55 & 1, it 
could just as easily have stated its conclusion in terms of inherent 
authority, or what the Restatement calls "inherent agency power." 
Whereas "apparent authority" arises from and in accordance 
with the principal's manifestations to third persons, Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 8 (1957), "inherent agency power" is "the 
power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent 
authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and 
exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with 
the servant or other agent," id. § 8A. Courts often use the term 
"apparent authority" loosely in cases involving inherent agency 
power. Id. § 8A comment b.4 In fact, one of the lead Utah cases 
q
 Even if the trial court did not mean inherent agency 
power when it referred to Ms. Luke's "apparent authority," this 
court may still affirm the judgment on the grounds of inherent 
agency power. See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.4 (Utah 
1987) (the appellate court can decide a case on a proper ground 
even though it was not argued by the parties); Goodsel v. Depart-
ment of Bus. Reg., 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) (the appellate 
court should affirm a judgment if it is sustainable on any legal 
theory apparent on the record, even if it is different from the 
theory stated by the trial court as the basis for its ruling and 
even though it was not raised in the trial court). 
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on inherent agency power stated the applicable rule in terms of 
"apparent" authority: 
It is a general principle of the law of 
agency, running through all contracts made by 
agents with third parties, that the principals 
are bound by the acts of their agents which fall 
within the apparent scope of the authority of 
the agents, and that the principals will not 
be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties, who 
have dealt with those agents in good faith. 
Harrison v. Auto Securities Co.. 70 Utah 11, 18, 257 P. 677 (1927). 
See also Forsvthe v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). 
The court in Harrison held that the principal was bound by its 
agent's sale of a car that the principal had expressly told the 
agent he could not sell. The plaintiff had dealt exclusively with 
the agent, and it does not appear from the court's opinion that 
the plaintiff even knew of the principal's existence. Thus, there 
could have been no apparent authority in the strict sense. Yet 
the court held the principal bound because the agent had acted 
"within the apparent scope" of its authority. 70 Utah at 18. 
Similarly, the trial court's use of the term "apparent authority" 
in this case does not preclude a finding of inherent agency power, 
which is amply supported by the record. 
Under the doctrine of inherent agency power, a general 
agent for a disclosed principal can bind the principal by acts 
done on his account if the acts "usually accompany or are incidental 
to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct" and if 
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"the other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized 
to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized*" Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 161 (1957). 
Ms. Luke was clearly a general agent of Prowswood, a 
disclosed principal. See supra pp. 15-16. Thus, she had inherent 
power to bind Prowswood if the guaranteed purchase agreement was 
the sort of act that usually accompanies or is incidental to trans-
actions that Ms. Luke was authorized to conduct. The trial court 
properly concluded that it was.5 
Wilbern McDougal, a realtor with over twenty-five years 
experience, testified that "most companies" in this area have some 
type of guaranteed sales program by which the brokerage agrees to 
buy a home if it is unsuccessful in selling it. He further tes-
tified that some agents, especially the more successful agents 
(such as Ms. Luke) were authorized to enter into such agreements. 
Richard S. Prows, President of Prowswood Corporation 
and Chairman of the Board of Prowswood, Ltd., testified that 
Prowswood has had, on occasion, programs under which it has agreed 
to buy a home or accept a home as a trade-in in order to sell 
5
 The trial court also properly concluded that the Nielsons 
reasonably believed that Ms. Luke was authorized and had no notice 
to the contrary. Prowswood had the burden of showing that the 
Nielsons knew or had reason to know that Ms. Luke had no authority 
to enter into the guaranteed purchase agreement. White v. Brock, 
584 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). Prowswood failed to 
meet its burden. The trial court found that the Nielsons acted 
reasonably under the circumstances. Record at 304 1 53. 
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property. He further testified that Prowswood agents would handle 
sales under such a program. 2 Tr. at 8-9. 
Moreover, under section 61-2-2 of the Utah Code, the 
Agreement was within Ms. Luke's statutory authority as a real estate 
sales agent. 
From all this evidence, the trial court could conclude 
that Ms. Luke had inherent power to bind Prowswood to the Agreement. 
The rationale for inherent agency power supports the 
trial court's conclusion. The rationale for finding liability 
based on inherent agency power is that it would be unfair for an 
enterprise that conducts its affairs through agents to have the 
benefit of their work without making it responsible for their 
excesses. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8A comment a. 
Commercial convenience requires that the prin-
cipal should not escape liability where there 
have been deviations from the usually granted 
authority by persons who are such essential 
parts of his business enterprise. In the long 
run, it is of advantage to business, and hence 
to employers as a class, that third persons 
should not be required to scrutinize too care-
fully the mandates of permanent or semi-per-
manent agents who do no more than what is 
usually done by agents in similar positions. 
Id. § 161 comment a. See also id. § 8A comment a (the inherent 
power of agents and the concomitant liabilities of their principals 
are created by the courts primarily for the protection of third 
persons, but, in the long run, "they inure to the benefit of the 
business world and hence to the advantage of employers as a class, 
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the members of which are plaintiffs as well as defendants in actions 
brought upon unauthorized transactions conducted by agents"). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT PROWSWOOD RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT. 
The trial court found as a matter of fact and a matter 
of law that Prowswood ratified the Agreement. Record at 305 fl 
56 & 3. Prowswood argues that this conclusion erroneously rests 
on findings that Prowswood received and retained a sales commission 
on the sale of unit 25 to the Nielsons. The trial court's Memo-
randum Decision makes it clear, however, that the court's finding 
that Prowswood ratified the Agreement was based on the June 10, 
1986, letter from Richard S. Prows to the Nielsons. Record at 
275. In that letter, Mr. Prows clearly expressed an intention to 
stand behind Ms. Luke in her dealings with the Nielsons and fulfill 
its "obligation" under the Agreements 
Rita has been a successful real estate 
agent for our firm for over 11 years. We have 
never had a moment's hesitation about her 
representations nor the contract negotiations 
in which she has been involved. Additionally, 
because of her reputation and the confidence 
we have in her, we have given her the latitude 
to waive receipt of commissions both for herself 
and for us as a brokerage when she feels that 
circumstances justify such an action. This 
current "agreement" is reflective of that type 
of commitment. 
Our current reputation for honesty and 
clarity is being tested by this situation. 
Because you are valuable friends, we have a 
special interest in seeing that your feelings 
and expectations are delicately dealt with. 
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In light of this, we feel that it is a rea-
sonable compromise that Rita, as the sub-agent 
for me, be permitted to immediately begin a 
marketing program of your property to affect 
[sic] a desired sale. In keeping with our 
original understanding of the "agreement", we 
will bear expenses relative to marketing your 
home and, of course, endeavor to net you the 
$160,000c00 mentioned in the November 29th 
"agreement" . . . . 
My involvement is to reaffirm our united 
stand and our deepest commitment to do all in 
our power to fulfill what we feel is our obli-
gation under this "agreement". 
Exhibit 4-P. 
It was certainly within the province of the trial court, 
as the trier of fact, to conclude that this letter evidenced Prows-
wood's intent to ratify the Agreement and stand behind its leading 
sales agent, regardless of the outcome. Prowswood obviously had 
a different understanding of the Agreement than the Nielsons had 
and offered what it believed was a "reasonable compromise." But 
the fact that Prowswood may have disputed the Nielsons' under-
standing of the Agreement does not mean that it was unwilling to 
stand behind the Agreement, whatever that Agreement was ultimately 
held to mean. The June 10, 1986, letter shows that willingness 
and thus Prowswood's intent to ratify. 
The June 10, 1986, letter, which is the basis for the 
trial court's finding of ratification, suffers from none of the 
defects of Prowswood's strawmen. The letter was written after 
the Nielsons had written Prowswood stating their understanding of 
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the Agreement and after they had met with Ms. Luke and Scott Dean, 
Ms. Luke's immediate supervisor, and had made their position clear. 
Thus, Prowswood had knowledge of the material facts. Moreover, 
the ratification was in writing, obviating any statute of frauds 
problem. 
This court should defer to the trial court's factual 
finding that Prowswood ratified the Agreement because the trial 
judge "had the benefit of extraordinarily important evidence that 
is entirely unavailable" to this court—namely, the demeanor of 
those who testified. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Sohm, 
755 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring and 
dissenting). Mr. Prows testified regarding his interpretation of 
the Agreement and his intentions. The trial court heard that 
testimony and could properly reject it. The trial court concluded 
that the June 10, 1986, letter meant what it said, namely, that 
Prowswood would honor its "obligation," whatever that obligation 
might prove to be. That conclusion was not clearly erroneous and 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING EVIDENCE 
OF MR. NIELSON'S EXPERIENCE AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER. 
Prowswood claims that the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of Mr. Nielson's experience as a real estate broker. 
However, the trial court admitted extensive evidence of Mr. Niel-
son's real estate experience. See 1 Tr. at 57-58, 97-99, 137-39, 
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142-44 & Exhibit 12-D (Mr. Nielsen's licensure history). When 
counsel for Prowswood began asking Mr. Nielson about matters 
occurring as much as seventeen years before, the court asked counsel 
"to be expeditious with your questioning" because "it seems to me 
that we have dealt with enough information as to [Mr. Nielson's] 
background." 1 Tr. at 139. Counsel for Prowswood then asked 
specific questions about Mr. Nielson's experience with various 
companies in 1971, 1974-76 and 1976-80, and the court sustained 
objections on the grounds of relevance. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Where, as here, the trial court has clearly been apprised of the 
witness's relevant experience, specific questions about that 
experience—such as how many agents were employed by the witness's 
company seventeen years before—would have limited usefulness in 
making the existence of any fact more or less probable and would 
therefore be of limited relevance. 
Moreover, given the extensive evidence already of record 
concerning Mr. Nielson's real estate experience, the trial court 
could have properly excluded the proffered evidence in the interest 
of time or as cumulative. See Utah R. Evid. 403 ("Although rele-
vant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
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stantially outweighed . . . by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). If 
the trial court has sustained a specific objection on the wrong 
grounds, the appellate court should uphold the ruling if there is 
any ground for excluding the evidence. See, e.g., 1 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 18 at 831 (P. Tillers rev. 1983). 
Although the excluded evidence may have been of limited relevance 
and hence technically admissible,^ the trial court could have 
properly excluded it under rule 403 as cumulative or in the interest 
of time. Thus, the trial court did not commit reversible error 
in excluding the evidence. See Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 
P.2d 541, 548 (Utah 1984) (no prejudice where the erroneously 
excluded evidence was cumulative). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's conclusion that Ms. Luke had power to 
bind Prowswood to the Agreement and that Prowswood ratified the 
Agreement were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the judgment of 
the trial court as to liability should be affirmed, and this matter 
should be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of 
offset to which the defendants are entitled. 
b
 The Nielsons recognize that remoteness usually goes to 
the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314, 323 n.30 (Utah 1979). 
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ADDENDUM 
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief, A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shill set fcrth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense- When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Rule 12, Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days 
after the service of the summons is complete unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a 
cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after the 
service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within 20 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by 
the cdurt, within 20 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise 
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as 
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading ire presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c)m Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) — (7) 
in Subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and 
the motion for judgment mentioned in Subdivision (c) of this rule shall be 
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after 
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court 
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order 
as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in Subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(jy Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate broker" means any 
person employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf 
of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set out in 
Subsection (7) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission established un-
der this chapter. 
(3) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concurring role must 
jointly agree for action to be taken. 
(4) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real Estate. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. 
(6) "Executive director" means the director of the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation. 
(7) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" means: 
(a) any person who for another and for valuable consideration, or 
who with the intention or in the expectation or upon the promise of 
receiving or collecting valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, pur-
chases, rents, or leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, 
rental, or leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the 
sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of, or lists or offers or 
attempts or agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees 
to collect rental for the use of real estate or who advertises, who buys 
or offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or otherwise deals in options on 
real estate or the improvements thereon or who collects or offers or 
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use of real estate or who 
advertises or holds himself, itself, or themselves out as engaged in 
the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting, or leasing 
real estate, or assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiation or closing of any transaction which does or is calculated 
to result in the sale, exchange, leasing, or renting of any real estate; 
and 
(b) any person, employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of 
lots or other parcels of real estate at a stated salary or upon a com-
mission or upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to sell 
such real estate or any parts thereof in lots or other parcels and who 
sells, exchanges, or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale 
or exchange of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
(8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business opportunities involv-
ing real property. 
(9) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" means any person em-
ployed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set out in Subsec-
tion (7) for valuable consideration. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah* 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of thus state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
